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Abstract In this paper we present a two-period model in which we examine
how concern about fairness might affect voter behavior. We show that in the
first period politicians choose the median voter’s position even if this does not
correspond to their bliss points and neither they nor the voters can commit
to a particular action. Moreover, concern about fairness creates substantial
incumbency advantages. Our results hold even if voters care very little about
fairness.
1 Introduction
Numerous experiments have shown that considerations of fairness are some-
times an important factor in determining human behavior.1 However, there
are next to no papers on how the perceived fairness of the policies chosen by
politicians affects the behavior of voters.2 But it does seem plausible that voters
do not merely pursue their own material interests when they vote, but also
care about fairness. For example, people are sometimes concerned about the
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1 See for example, the empirical results of Kahneman et al. (1986) on price-setting by firms. Also
compare Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) for an overview of the areas where social preferences matter.
2 An exception is Hahn (2004), who applies the concept of reciprocity introduced by Rabin (1993)
andDufwenberg andKirchsteiger (2004) to amodel of voter behavior. Galasso (2003) and Sausgru-
ber andTyran (2006) examine the impact of voters’ concern for fairness on the level of redistribution
policy. There are many papers in the social choice literature that discuss the fairness of allocations
or the fairness of procedures (see, e.g., Karni 1996; Chavas and Coggins 2003).
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perks and privileges of politicians and may feel dissatisfied when these rents
are too high. This might also affect voters’ decisions about who to vote for. In
general terms, people may dislike politicians being better off than themselves,
e.g., because they believe that politicians pursue policies that are in their own
interests or that they do not work hard enough. In this paper, we show that
considerations of fairness may provide a potential mechanism for the way in
which past behavior of politicians may affect voter behavior. It may also induce
politicians to adopt the median voter’s preferred policy, even if they are not
able to commit to a particular policy in advance. Thus our model yields a new
variant of the Median Voter Theorem.
It is well-known that political parties may adopt the median voter position if
they can commit to future policy in advance. This observation is known as the
“MedianVoter Theorem” (cf. Downs 1957). If, however, political parties cannot
commit to following a particular policy in the future and voters are standard
rational utility-maximizing agents, then parties have no incentive to pursue the
median voter’s preferred policy unless political parties are not interested in the
policies implemented. One way of motivating convergence between political
parties is to consider reputation-building in an infinite-horizon framework (see
Alesina 1988).
If the time horizon is not infinite and voters are standard rational utility-max-
imizers who cannot commit to a specific voting behavior, then the re-election
of an incumbent can only depend on the past behavior of a politician if the
politician’s behavior has revealed new information about the politician’s char-
acteristics (e.g. her competence or preferences). However, misconduct or abuse
by politicians represent sunk costs and normally cannot be punished by voters
if they cannot commit to a certain voting behavior in advance. Thus elections
could not be used to discipline politicians in such a model, although disciplining
politicians by holding them accountable is usually thought to be one of the
important functions of elections (see e.g. Persson et al. 1997). In the literature,
retrospective voting rules are thus frequently adopted (see, among others, Barro
1973; Ferejohn 1986; Persson et al. 1997; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Voters
are assumed to be able to commit to a voting rule at the beginning of the period,
which enables the election to discipline the policy-maker. However, this may
seem somewhat ad hoc and hence unsatisfactory, as it is not clear how voters
should commit to a (time-inconsistent) behavior. Accordingly, this paper can be
viewed as amicroeconomic foundation for retrospective voting, as in ourmodel
the politician’s decision in period one affects her chances of being re-elected
in the next period without resorting to the ad hoc assumption of retrospective
voting. Past decisions of politicians make them better off or worse off compared
to voters. This may, e.g., induce voters to vote against the incumbent party if
they feel jealous of its members because it has adopted a policy that was in its
members’ own interests. By dismissing the incumbent party, voters may thus
prevent it from pursuing its interests for another period.
There are several approaches to integrating fairness and reciprocity
into game theory, among them Rabin (1993), Levine (1998) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). The concept of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has the advantage
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of being technically easy to handle, because standard equilibrium concepts like
Nash equilibrium can be applied. They introduce an additional term to people’s
utility, namely that people care not only about their own payoffs but also about
the fairness of outcomes. People are assumed to focus on self-centered inequity,
i.e., they dislike others being better off than themselves and may also dislike
other people being worse off than themselves (the latter effect usually being
less pronounced).
An alternative way of integrating considerations of fairness into models of
voting would be to use the model by Rabin (1993) or the generalization to
dynamic games by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).3 This avenue is pur-
sued by Hahn (2004). He finds that politicians move closer to the median
voter’s position when reciprocal motives towards politicians are important. He
also shows that the incumbent has a strong advantage.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present a model where politi-
cians may choose from an interval of possible policies. In the following section,
we construct the equilibrium without fairness and show that politicians cannot
be motivated to choose the median voter’s preferred policy. In Sect. 4 we dis-
cuss how the concept of fairness presented by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can be
integrated into our model. The solution with reciprocity is proposed in Sect. 5.
In Sect. 6 we discuss the robustness of our results and present our conclusions
in Sect. 7.
2 Model
We assume that there is a continuum of potential policies in each period,
represented by the interval [−1;+1]. There is an odd number N of voters
who are characterized by their bliss points τ . The ideal positions of voters
τ are equally spaced on the interval [−1;+1], i.e., the set of voters is N :={
−1,−1 + 2N−1 , . . . , 0, . . . 1 − 2N−1 , 1
}
. The utility of voters is u(t)τ = −
(
τ − p(t))2
in each period t.4 We assume that the discount factors amount to δ = 1. This
assumption is not crucial but simplifies our analysis. p(t) denotes the policy pur-
sued by the government in period t. We assume that there are two politicians
(or political parties), a left-wing politician,L, and a right-wing politician,R. Pol-
iticians are not interested in holding office per se, but have utility functions u(t)τL
and u(t)τR with τL = −P and τR = +P, respectively (P ∈]0, 1]).5 Their discount
3 Another generalization of the basic concept has been introduced by Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
4 Note that our assumption that the bliss points are equally spaced is not important. Our results
hold for arbitrarily distributed ideal positions as long as the median voter’s position is not too far
away from τ = 0.
5 The symmetry of the politicians’ bliss points simplifies the analysis considerably, otherwise the
equilibrium values cannot be determined analytically. However, it seems unlikely that our findings
would change qualitatively if politicians’ bliss points were somewhat asymmetric. The scenario with
τ = 0 would be formally equivalent to the case with asymmetric bliss points for politicians.
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factors also amount to δ = 1. Hence, politicians are only interested in the type
of policies ultimately implemented.6
There are two periods. At the beginning of the first period each citizen votes
for a politician. The politician who gets the majority of votes is elected presi-
dent. Then the newly elected president chooses a policy p(1) from the range of
possible policies [−1;+1]. At the beginning of the second period, voters can
either re-elect the president or select the alternative candidate instead. Then
the politician again chooses a policy p(2) (p(2) ∈ [−1;+1]). Note that we assume
that voters cannot commit to certain behavior in advance.
Wewill identify subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for the standard case where
voters are not affected by fairness and for the case with inequity aversion. As
voting games often involvemultiple equilibria, we apply the following tie-break-
ing rule. If a voter is not pivotal, he will always vote for the candidate who will
guarantee the largest overall utility when elected. Moreover, we assume that in
the first period the median voter (τ = 0) will randomize between both candi-
dates with equal probability if he is indifferent. In the following, we will always
refer to this class of equilibria, e.g., when we consider uniqueness.
3 Solution when fairness does not matter
It is easy to show that, if wedonot consider fairness, only the following equilibria
exist:
Proposition 1 When voters do not care about fairness, the president will always
pursue her preferred policy, i.e. in both periods a left-wing (right-wing) politician
chooses τ = −P (τ = +P). Voters with τ < 0 (τ > 0) will always vote for
the left-wing (right-wing) candidate. The median voter with τ = 0 is indifferent
between both candidates and votes for each politician with probability 1/2 in the
first period. In the second period he also randomizes between both politicians,
voting for the left-wing politician with some probability σ (σ ∈ [0; 1]) and for the
other candidate with probability 1 − σ .
Thus, in the first period, no politician has an incentive to deviate from her pre-
ferred policy by adopting a policy that is closer to the median position τ = 0.
Since voters are purely forward-looking when casting votes at the beginning
of the second period, adopting a more moderate policy will not improve the
politician’s chances of being re-elected.
4 Introducing fairness into our model
According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the utility function of players should
be augmented by additional terms describing inequity aversion, i.e., players
6 For simplicity, we assume that politicians do not vote. This simplifies the analysis but is not
essential to our results.
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dislike inequity unfavorable to them. In addition, they may dislike or like ineq-
uity favorable to them. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume
that voters are only interested in inequity between themselves and politicians.
This may be justified by the observation that election campaigns and the media
often focus heavily on the personalities of politicians. Thus voters may develop
stronger feelings towards politicians than towards other voters. We might also
incorporate inequity aversion of voters with respect to other voters. However,
one might adopt the interpretation that the bliss points τ already incorporate
voters’ inequity aversionwith respect to other voters. Similarly, onemight argue
that politicians’ bliss points −P and P, respectively, already incorporate their
concerns about inequity. We follow Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in considering
only self-centered inequity aversion, i.e., a player does not care about inequity
between two other players.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) focus on piecewise linear inequity aversion. We






= uτ (p(1)) + uτ (p(2))
+ f
(




uτ (p(1)) + uτ (p(2)) − uτR(p(1)) − uτR(p(2))
)
(1)
The first two terms are the standard intertemporal utility under the assump-
tion that the discount factor is 1. The third term captures aversion with respect
to inequity between the utility of politician L and the voter. The fourth term
depends on the inequity between the utility of politician R and the voter.
Note that we will make specific assumptions about f (x) later. We implicitly
assume that voter’s feelings about fairness are equally strong towards both pol-
iticians, since we use the same function f (x) for both. This seems plausible in the
first period of the game. However, at the beginning of the second period one
might argue that feelings should be stronger towards the incumbent, because
she is more prominent in the media, whereas the alternative candidate may be
relatively unknown. If this effect is not too strong, our results continue to hold.7
Note that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) compare payoffs at final nodes to describe
inequity. By contrast, we compare the intertemporal utility of agents. This im-
plies that individuals suffering from inequity in one period can be compensated
for at a later stage. The following example illustrates why we think this is a
plausible approach. One out of two individuals has to perform an unpleasant
task in every period, e.g., two students who share an apartment have to clean
it every week. Then most people would consider it much more fair for the two
individuals to perform the task alternately than for one individual to perform
the task in every period. Similarly, it is plausible that someone who has to
7 In this case, a right-wing (left-wing) politicianwould choose amoderately leftist (rightist) position
in the first period of the game. Incumbents will always be re-elected.
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perform the unpleasant task every time, while the other person never does so,
would incur additional losses from feeling treated unfairly. However, if both
individuals do the task alternately, both individuals may not suffer from instan-
taneous inequity very much when it is their turn to perform the task, since they
know that the other individual also performs the same task regularly.
One might ask whether comparing standard sums of discounted per-period
utilities would be appropriate, in particular if we extended our model to more
than two periods. Then it might seem reasonable that unequal per-period util-
ity that occurred some periods ago does not affect the behavior of players as
strongly as present inequity. One could discount past utility to capture this
effect. Inequity, i.e., the argument of f (·), could be measured by comparing




t=1 ρtu−t (0 < δ < 1, 0 < ρ < 1), where
the first term describes present and future per-period utility, whereas the second
sum captures past utility. The factor ρ is introduced to take account of the fact
that the memory of past inequity may fade away as time passes. However, we
refrain from pursuing these considerations as they do not seem as crucial for a
two-period model as for a multi-period model.
We now have to make some assumptions about f (·), which measures the dis-
utility (or utility) from unequal outcomes. We make the following assumptions:
f (0) = 0 (2)
f ′(x) > 0 ∀x < 0 (3)
f ′′(x) < 0 ∀x (4)
f ′(x) ≥ −1
2
∀x ≥ 0 (5)
f (−x) < f (x) ∀x > 0 (6)
Note that x > 0 describes a case of inequity favorable to the individual, whereas
x < 0 captures a case of unfavorable inequity. The first assumption is a nor-
malization and implies that the additional utility or disutility from inequity
aversion is zero if there is no inequity. The second condition holds because
decreasing unfavorable inequity lowers the losses from inequity aversion. The
third assumption implies increasing marginal losses from unfavorable inequity.
It also implies decreasing marginal gains from profitable inequity or increasing
marginal losses from profitable inequity, respectively. The fourth assumption
guarantees that a player cannot increase his overall utility by “throwing away”
some of his utility when there is inequity that is favorable to him. Note that
the overall change in utility amounts to −u − 2f ′(x)u when a marginal unit
u of per-period utility is thrown away and favorable inequity x is identical
towards both other players. If our assumption holds, this expression is weakly
negative. The last assumption describes the fact that for any amount of inequity
x the player will prefer a situation where the inequity is to his own advantage
to the case where the same amount of inequity is to his disadvantage.
Additionally, we assume that either f (x) > 0 ∀x > 0 or f (x) < 0 ∀x > 0.
Thus we distinguish between the case where advantageous inequity is deemed
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Fig. 1 An example of the
function f (x) for voters who




Fig. 2 An example of the
function f (x) for voters who




desirable and the case where people feel bad if someone else is worse off than
themselves.
In Figs. 1 and 2 we demonstrate two examples of f (x). In the first figure, vot-
ers like being better off than others, while in the second example voters incur
losses if others have lower payoffs than themselves. Note that in both cases
voters dislike others being better off.
5 Solution when fairness matters
Now we solve the model for inequity-averse voters. Note that any politician
will always choose her preferred policy in the second period of the game,
i.e., a left-wing politician will choose −P, whereas a right-wing politician will
choose +P.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the right-wing politician has
been elected in the first period. Now we consider the decision of voter τ at the
beginning of the second period. We assume that, even if he is not pivotal, each
voter will always vote for the candidate who will guarantee the largest overall
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utility when elected. If the incumbent is re-elected, voter τ ’s utility in the second
period is given by
Uτ (p,+P) = −(P − τ)2 + f
(




−(p − τ)2 − (P − τ)2 + (p + P)2 + 4P2
)
= −(P − τ)2 + f
(




2(τp − τ 2 + τP + Pp + 2P2)
)
where p is the policy implemented by the right-wing politician in the first period
of the game. Note that we have applied the fact that the right-wing politician
will choose +P in the second period of the game.
When the alternative candidate is elected at the beginning of the second
period, voter τ ’s utility amounts to
Uτ (p,−P) = −(P + τ)2 + f
(




−(p − τ)2 − (P + τ)2 + (p + P)2
)
= −(P + τ)2 + f
(




2(τp − τ 2 − τP + Pp)
)
Thus voting for the incumbent is desirable if the following difference in losses
is positive:
U(p, τ) := Uτ (p,+P) − Uτ (p,−P) (7)
Note that U(p, τ) = −U(−p,−τ) due to the symmetry of the problem.
The following proposition will prove useful:
Proposition 2 If the right-wing (left-wing) candidate has been elected in the first
period, no voter with τ ≤ 0 (τ ≥ 0) will vote for her if she chooses a policy
p > 0 (p < 0) in the first period.
The proof is given in the appendix. It follows immediately that a politician
will not be re-elected if she chooses her favorite policy −P or +P, respectively.
Intuitively, if a politician chooses a policy that is advantageous to herself, then
she will make the voter with τ = 0 jealous. If the politician were re-elected,
she would implement a policy that would again be beneficial to herself. This,
in turn, would make the median voter even more jealous. Thus the voter with
τ = 0 would prefer the other candidate to be elected, as she has not benefitted
from the policy in the first period. By dismissing a politician who has adopted a
very selfish policy, the voter with τ = 0 can achieve an intertemporal balancing
of inequity, as it seems more fair to the voter that each candidate should enjoy
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favorable policy in one period and suffer from detrimental policy in the other
period, as opposed to the case where one politician enjoys an advantageous
policy in both periods while the other candidate always suffers from policy that
she dislikes.
In the Appendix we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If a right-wing (left-wing) incumbent chooses p = 0 in the first
period, then all voters with τ > 0 (τ < 0) will vote for her. The voter with τ = 0
will always be indifferent between both politicians if the office holder in the first
period chooses p = 0.
We now argue that it is optimal for a right-wing candidate to choose p = 0 in
the first period if this ensures re-election, instead of choosing P and not being
re-elected. The gain in utility in the first period that is the result of choosing
P instead of p = 0 amounts to P2. The loss in utility as a consequence of the
policy pursued by the left-wing politician in the second period is given by (2P)2.
Hence any politician would choose p = 0 if this enabled her to be re-elected.8
In the Appendix we also prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If a right-wing (left-wing) incumbent chooses a slightly negative
(positive) p in the first period, then all voters with τ ≥ 0 (τ ≤ 0) will vote for her
in the second period.
Since, for p = 0, the median voter is indifferent with respect to both candi-
dates, one might think that equilibria might exist, where the incumbent is not
re-elected. This, however, is not the case. A right-wing candidate can always
choose a p slightly smaller than 0. Then U is strictly positive for the median
voter and all voters with τ > 0. Consequently, the right-wing candidate will
always be re-elected. A similar argument holds for the left-wing politician. This
is an important result, as it illustrates the advantage of the incumbent politician,
who is always re-elected.
In the first period of the game, it is obvious that all voters with τ < 0 will vote
for the left-wing politician whereas all voters with τ > 0 will vote for the right-
wing politician. In the first period, the median voter is indifferent with regard
to both candidates. According to our assumption, he will randomize between
both candidates with equal probability.
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5 For the game with inequity aversion, the following unique equi-
librium exists: at the beginning of the first period all voters with τ < 0 (τ > 0)
vote for the left-wing (right-wing) candidate. The median voter with τ = 0 ran-
domizes between both candidates with equal probability. At the beginning of the
second period, a left-wing (right-wing) incumbent is re-elected iff she has chosen
a policy p ≥ 0 (p ≤ 0). Both types of politicians choose p = 0 in the first period
8 If the discount factor were very small, no politician would choose p = 0 to ensure re-election.
However, note that by incurring losses in the first period the politician can prevent losses in the
second period from being four times as high.
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and are thus re-elected. In the second period, politicians always pursue their own
interests, i.e., they opt for −P or +P, respectively.
The proposition can be thought of as a variant of the Median Voter Theorem.
In the first period, the median voter’s position is adopted no matter which
politician is elected.
If a right-wing politician chose a positive p, then the median voter would
be jealous of her, as his utility would be lower compared to the utility of the
right-wing politician. At the same time, the utility of the left-wing politician
would be lower than the voter’s own utility, which might even cause the median
voter to feel pity for the left-wing politician. Hence the right-wing candidate
would not be re-elected.
By choosing p = 0 instead of −P or +P, respectively, the incumbent can
decrease her own utility as well as increase the utility of the median voter
and the utility of the other candidate. This equals out the difference between
the median voter’s utility and the utility of the incumbent and the difference
between the median voter’s utility and the other candidate’s utility. In other
words, by choosing p = 0 the politician ensures that the median voter is no
more jealous of her than he would be of the alternative candidate if he had
chosen her. If the incumbent chose a position closer to her own bliss point, then
the median voter would be more jealous of the incumbent than of the other
candidate and thus would not re-elect the incumbent.
6 Robustness
It is important to note that our findings hold on a very general scale. Consider
the case where the function capturing inequity aversion f (x) is arbitrarily small
(but satisfies our assumptions). This implies that voters care very little about
fairness. Even in this case, our results remain valid. Nor is it crucial for all voters
to share the same notion of inequity aversion. All voters could be characterized
by different functions fi(x), where some voters might like favorable inequity,
i.e., fi(x) > 0 ∀x > 0 and some might dislike being better off, i.e., fi(x) < 0
∀x > 0. This would not affect our results.9 Our results would remain valid even
if the median voter were the only one to care about fairness and all other voters
did not care about inequity at all. The distribution of voters’ bliss points is also
irrelevant, as long as the median voter’s bliss point is the average of the bliss
points of both politicians. It is not crucial for the politician who runs against the
incumbent at the beginning of the second period to be the same politician who
lost the election in the first period. Hence, if a politician who has lost an election
is replaced by a politician with identical preferences, our findings continue to
hold. We could also extend our model to a multi-period setting. If we abstract
from the difficulties detailed in Sect. 4 and set the discount factor δ and the
9 In particular, one might surmise that left-wing voters are more inequity-averse than right-wing
voters. This would have no impact on our findings.
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“memory factor” ρ to 1 in a multi-period version of our model, then politicians
would choose the median position in every period, except for the last period.10
7 Conclusions
Our paper gives us three insights. Firstly, fairness can have important conse-
quences in elections as it may deliver a mechanism explaining how past behav-
ior of politicians may affect future voter behavior. In standard models where
rational utility-maximizing voters are unable to commit to a specific voting
scheme, the past behavior of the government can only affect voter behavior
to the extent that it reveals hidden information about characteristics of the
government (e.g. about competence or preferences). In a way, we provide a
microeconomic foundation for retrospective voting which is often assumed to
solve the problem that past misbehavior by politicians cannot be punished by
rational utility-maximizing voters. Secondly, fairness may make it more likely
thatmoderate positions (e.g. the position of themedian voter) are adopted even
if parties cannot commit to future policies. Thirdly, we have shown that the very
existence of inequity aversion gives the incumbent a substantial advantage in
elections.
Ourmodel also enables us to discuss the desirability of term limits.According
to our model, term limits seem to be disadvantageous, since politicians choose
their favorite policy in their last term in office. Compared to τ = 0, which is the
policy implemented by a politician angling for re-election, this is detrimental
for a majority of voters.
Our paper has shown that fairness may be important for voter behavior.
There are several interesting issues left for future research. In a richer model,
onemight discuss the optimal remunerationof politicians andhowwages impact
on the effort and the policy chosen by the incumbent. It would also be interest-
ing to examine how incentive contracts for politicians, which have been intro-
duced by Gersbach (2004), should be designed if voters are inequity averse.
Considerations of fairness may reduce the need for incentive contracts if the
consequences of political projects are observable. However, in the face of pro-
jects with short-term costs for voters and benefits that are observable only in the
long run, voters’ considerations of fairness may reduce the incentives for politi-
cians to adopt these projects. In this case incentive contracts may be particularly
beneficial.
The incumbency advantage seems to lower competition between politicians.
This might be detrimental. It might also deter the entry of new, possibly very
competent candidates. Thus it is interesting to establish which mechanisms
might destroy the incumbent’s advantage and whether it would be advanta-
geous to adopt them.
10 In a multi-period model, interesting institutional features such as two-period term limits could
be examined.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
First we show that
U(p, τ) < 0
if τ ≤ 0 and p > 0. This condition guarantees that a right-wing incumbent
yields a higher utility for all voters with τ ≤ 0 if p > 0. Let us first introduce the
following abbreviations:
a1 = 2(τp − τ 2 + τP − Pp)
a2 = 2(τp − τ 2 + τP + Pp + 2P2)
a3 = 2(τp − τ 2 − τP − Pp + 2P2)
a4 = 2(τp − τ 2 − τP + Pp)
Thus we can rewrite the above inequality as
4Pτ + f (a1) + f (a2) − f (a3) − f (a4) < 0 (8)
First, we analyze the case where people dislike others being worse off, i.e.,
f (x) < 0 ∀x > 0. We distinguish between two cases.
1. Let us for themoment assume that−P ≤ τ ≤ 0.We note that a1 < 0, a2 ≥ 0
and a4 ≥ 0. It is also straightforward to check that a4 ≤ −a1. Thus we obtain
f (a1) − f (a4) < f (−a1) − f (a4) ≤ 0 where we have used that f (−x) < f (x)
∀x > 0 and that f (x) is strictly monotonously decreasing for x > 0. In addi-
tion to−P ≤ τ ≤ 0, we now consider the case where τ ≤ −p. It is easy to see
that a3 ≥ a2 ≥ 0.As f ′(x) ≥ − 12 ∀x > 0, we obtain f (a3) ≥ f (a2)− 12 (a3−a2).
This is equivalent to: f (a2) − f (a3) ≤ 12 (a3 − a2) = −2τP − 2Pp. Since−2τP − 2Pp < −4Pτ , we have f (a2) − f (a3) < −4Pτ . Combining this
inequality with f (a1) − f (a4) < 0 and τ ≤ 0 yields (8). Now we assume, in
addition to −P ≤ τ ≤ 0, that τ > −p. If a3 ≥ 0, then we have 0 ≤ a3 < a2.
It immediately follows that f (a2)− f (a3) < 0, because f (x) is strictly monot-
onously decreasing for x > 0. Together with f (a1)− f (a4) < 0 we obtain (8).
If a3 < 0, then a1 ≤ a3 < 0 and a2 ≥ a4 ≥ 0. Hence, we obtain f (a2) ≤ f (a4)
and f (a1) ≤ f (a3). By combining these inequalities, we obtain (8) for τ < 0.
It is straightforward to show that (8) also holds for τ = 0.
2. Let us now assume that −1 ≤ τ < −P. We note that a1 < a3 < −a1.
Consequently we obtain f (a1) < f (a3). It is easy to see that a2 < a4 < −a2.
This implies f (a2) < f (a4). By combining f (a2) < f (a4), f (a1) < f (a3) and
τ ≤ 0 we can again conclude that (8) holds.
Second, we check the case with f (x) > 0 ∀x > 0, which is the case where
people like being better off than other people. Note that now f (x) is a strictly
monotonously increasing function. Let us first consider the case τ ≤ −p. Since
a3 ≥ a2, we have f (a2)−f (a3) ≤ 0. Because a1 < a4, we obtain f (a1)−f (a4) < 0.
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Hence (8) again holds. Now we examine the case τ ≤ −P. Because a2 ≤ a4 and
a1 < a3, we obtain f (a2) ≤ f (a4) and f (a1) < f (a3) which yields (8). Finally, let
us assume that τ > −p and τ > −P. Then it is easy to show that a1 < a3 < a2
and a1 < a4 < a2. We now define f ∗(x) := f (a1) + f (a2)−f (a1)a2−a1 (x − a1). Note that
f (a1) = f ∗(a1) and f (a2) = f ∗(a2). Since f (x) is a concave function, we also
obtain f ∗(x) < f (x) ∀x ∈]a1; a2[. We can conclude that
f (a1) + f (a2) − f (a3) − f (a4)
< f (a1) + f (a2) − f ∗(a3) − f ∗(a4)
= f (a1) + f (a2)
−
(




f (a1) + f (a2) − f (a1)a2 − a1 (a4 − a1)
)
= [f (a2) − f (a1)




where we have used the fact that a1 + a2 − a3 − a4 < 0, a2 − a1 > 0 and
f (a2) − f (a1) > 0. Hence, (8) holds. 	unionsq
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
One part of the proposition is the claim that the median voter with τ = 0 is
indifferent between both candidates if p = 0. This can be easily verified by
observing that U(0, 0) = 0 follows from U(p, τ) = −U(−p,−τ).
Now we prove that all voters with τ > 0 strictly prefer voting for the right-
wing candidate at the beginning of the second period if the incumbent has
chosen p = 0 in the first period.
We distinguish between two cases. First, we consider the case where advanta-
geous inequity is desirable from the perspective of voters, i.e., f (x) > 0 ∀x > 0.
Using the definitions introduced in the proof of Proposition 2, we state that
a1 > a4 and a2 > a3 for τ > 0 and p = 0. This implies f (a2) − f (a3) > 0 and
f (a1) − f (a4) > 0. Thus we obtain 4Pτ + f (a1) + f (a2) − f (a3) − f (a4) > 0.
Second, we consider the case where advantageous inequity reduces the over-
all utility of voters, i.e., f (x) < 0 ∀x > 0.
1. Assume 0 < τ ≤ P. Note that a4 < 0, a1 ≥ 0 and −a4 > a1. This implies
f (a1) − f (a4) > f (a1) − f (−a4) > 0.
Note that a2 > 0, a3 ≥ 0 and a2 > a3. Since f ′(x) ≥ − 12 , we can conclude
f (a2) ≥ f (a3) − 12 (a2 − a3) = f (a3) − τP > f (a3) − 4τP.
Combining these inequalities yields: 4Pτ + f (a1)+ f (a2)− f (a3)− f (a4) > 0.
2. Assume P < τ ≤ 1. Then a1 < 0, a3 < 0 and a3 < a1. Thus, the following
inequality holds: f (a1) − f (a3) > 0.
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We also observe that a4 < 0. If P < τ ≤ 2P, then a2 ≥ 0 and −a4 > a2,
which implies f (a2) − f (a4) > f (a2) − f (−a4) > 0. If τ > 2P, then a2 < 0
and a2 > a4, which also implies f (a2) − f (a4) > 0.
Thus we obtain 4Pτ + f (a1) + f (a2) − f (a3) − f (a4) > 0.
Hence, all voters with τ > 0 always vote for the right-wing candidate in the
second period if she has chosen policy p = 0 in the first period. 	unionsq
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
It suffices to show that ∂U/∂p is negative for p = 0 and τ = 0. This implies that
the median voter is strictly better off when voting for a right-wing incumbent
if the right-wing incumbent chooses a slightly negative p. Since U is strictly
positive for τ > 0 and p = 0, it follows that all voters with τ > 0 also strictly
prefer voting for a right-wing incumbent when p is slightly negative.
For p = 0 and τ = 0 we obtain
∂U
∂p
= −2Pf ′(0) + 2Pf ′(4P2) − f ′(4P2)(−2P) − f ′(0)(2P) (9)
= 4P
(
f ′(4P2) − f ′(0)
)
(10)
This expression is negative since f is a concave function. 	unionsq
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